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their citizens? Do other states have a 
responsibility to intervene when citizens’ 
states do not? Do human rights trump 
sovereignty? For over two decades, we 
have failed to answer these questions� 
If the “international community” 
has no answer, how can we expect 
fighters—a young soldier battling 
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan or 
a drone pilot sitting in an operations 
center tracking a suspected terrorist in 
Yemen—to answer them? The received 
law of war was not designed for this�
Efforts to fit modern war into this 
structure create more problems in 
turn, undermining both domestic 
and international law� The rule of 
law, Brooks argues, is critical to all 
societies and to international order� 
One solution she suggests is to update 
our laws and international structures, 
as challenging as that task might be� 
We should think of war and peace as 
poles on a spectrum, and envision that 
we move closer to one or the other over 
time� We should reject rigid definitions 
of war as an all-or-nothing concept�
Brooks argues that endless war 
undermines American institutions as 
well as the rule of law� The Department 
of Defense has assumed missions 
that it is ill equipped by culture and 
training to perform—such as nation 
building and civil reconstruction—at 
the expense of other agencies that 
traditionally have carried out American 
public policy and diplomacy overseas, 
such as the State Department� Brooks 
submits that, for policy implementation, 
the military has become a one-stop 
shopping center—like Walmart�
Brooks’s tale also chronicles a 
personal journey� As the child of 
antiwar activists, then throughout her 
career as a law professor, human rights 
lawyer, State Department lawyer, and 
Defense Department official, she has 
experienced and here relates her close 
encounters with most of the subjects 
about which she writes, in part owing 
to her marriage to an Army Special 
Forces officer� Anyone who has served 
in the Pentagon in any capacity will 
get a chuckle or two from Brooks’s 
tales of her time in this unique place�
This book is informative, enlightening, 
and entertaining� As director of national 
security legal studies at the Army War 
College from 2000 to 2006, I struggled 
to answer the same questions Brooks 
addresses in her book� How Everything 
Became War and the Military Became 
Everything should be required reading 
for anyone interested in military strategy 
and national security, or anyone who 
wonders how we got where we are today 
and how we might find a better way�
THOMAS W� MCSHANE
Rough Waters: Sovereignty and the American Mer-
chant Flag, by Rodney P� Carlisle, with Bradford 
Smith� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2017� 304 pages� $31�95�
Rough Waters is a historical review of 
the use and significance of the port of 
registry (which yields a “flag state”) 
of merchant vessels� Author Rodney 
Carlisle has revisited his prior work 
Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and 
Evolution of the Panamanian and 
Liberian Flags of Convenience (Naval 
Institute Press, 1982, out of print) 
and augmented it with his other prior 
periodical work to provide a deeper 
history of the use of merchant ship flags�
Generally speaking, Rough Waters is 
well researched—with the profound 
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exception of the defamatory analysis 
of and allegations about the Liberian 
registry during the period 2001–2003� 
The source of most of this misinforma-
tion is provocative allegations deriving 
from a commercial lawsuit, as well as an 
inaccurate reference to a UN report� The 
lawsuit was withdrawn and the allega-
tions were never substantiated, as they 
were and remain patently false� Further-
more, the author’s incorrect and loosely 
referenced opinion that the Marshall 
Islands flag constitutes a de facto second 
U�S� registry cannot go unmentioned� 
Contrary to the statement that the 
Marshall Islands flag registry has been 
structured along the Delaware domestic 
model to aid U�S� strategic interests, 
the reality is that the Marshall Islands 
registry was formed by copying Liberian 
law and constitutes an impropriety 
constructed for commercial purpose and 
private financial gain� For these reasons, 
this reviewer is unable to recommend 
Rough Waters, or to endorse it as an 
accurate review of the impact of foreign 
flags on the American merchant fleet�
Rough Waters attempts to address the 
role of foreign flags in the decline of the 
American merchant marine� Despite 
providing some evidence to the contrary, 
the author articulates a one-sided thesis 
that foreign flags predominantly are 
used for sinister or nefarious purposes� 
He further suggests that commercial 
interests, in their taking advantage 
of less-developed nations, were the 
predominant cause of the collapse 
of the U�S�-flag fleet� Curiously, the 
book chronicles, yet fails to highlight, 
that one of the most prevalent flags of 
convenience throughout history was the 
British flag—and the greatest facilitator 
of alternative registration of U�S�-owned 
ships was the U�S� government�
Rough Waters describes in interesting 
detail the intentional use of nonnational 
flags as a means to mislead, to dissuade, 
and often to evade pursuit by navies and 
other authorities� Whether it was the 
slave trade, the Southern or Northern 
fleets on either side of the U�S� Civil War, 
rum-running during U�S� Prohibition, 
or U�S� involvement in World War I and 
the early half of World War II, the lack 
of technology during these eras meant 
that identification of a ship’s national-
ity depended on visually sighting the 
flag flying on its stern� This made use 
of the flag ripe for manipulation�
While some of these practices indeed 
were nefarious, others served legitimate 
purposes, and the U�S� government 
encouraged them� During the Civil 
War, ships changed flag because the 
Northern and Southern governments 
could not protect them� In the 1870s, 
building ships in the United States was 
expensive, so shipowners sought to 
construct and register ships abroad—a 
situation that continues today� In the 
lead-up to both world wars, the U�S� 
State Department and the U�S� Shipping 
Board facilitated transfer of the major-
ity of U�S� ships to the Panamanian 
flag� Despite the assertion in Rough 
Waters that use of Panama’s flag was 
immoral, the political landscape and 
the rise of fascism in Europe made use 
of a foreign flag a political necessity�
Of particular interest to Review readers 
may be elements of Alfred Thayer 
Ma han’s theories on sea power� Rough 
Waters illustrates the practical impos-
sibility of even the world’s greatest 
navy protecting domestically registered 
commercial ships in all the far reaches of 
the earth� History provides only a very 
few examples of the U�S� Navy coming 
directly to the aid of a merchant ship� In 
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each of those cases, logistical conve-
nience and a specific political interest 
were the determining factors for inter-
vention� If a merchant vessel possesses 
strategic interest, its flag has never pre-
vented the U�S� Navy from taking action�
Currently, almost 75 percent of the 
world’s global trading merchant fleet 
is registered with ten flag states� Of 
these ten, only those of Greece and the 
People’s Republic of China are consid-
ered “national flags�” The remaining 
64 percent of these commercial ships 
are registered in Panama, Liberia, the 
Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malta, the Bahamas, or Cyprus� Rough 
Waters fails to consider or identify the 
impacts of shifts in global trade and 
trade economics, technology, and ship 
ownership, construction, financing, 
and crewing, which are the realities 
that underlie the choice of a flag state� 
Very few ships are owned by “pure” 
U�S� companies, and the global use 
of global flags did not cause the col-
lapse of the U�S� merchant marine�
SCOTT BERGERON
Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military 
Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016� 256 pages� 
$39�95�
This is a quirky yet ultimately enjoyable 
book� The association of the author, 
Barton Whaley, with the U�S� intelligence 
services dates back to the Korean War� 
He earned his undergraduate degree 
from Berkeley and his PhD from MIT� 
Over the course of his career Whaley 
worked with or for the U�S� Army, 
the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
the director of national intelligence� 
A� Denis Clift, president of the Na-
tional Intelligence University, referred to 
Whaley as “the undisputed dean of U�S� 
denial and deception experts�” Whaley 
died in 2013, leaving behind several 
completed volumes and a legacy as a 
man with a passion for and an encyclo-
pedic knowledge of military deception�
A central assumption of Practise to 
Deceive is that the only tool that has a 
hope of “dispelling the fog of war” is  
intelligence—but it is the task of the 
deception planner to keep that fog 
thick� When deception planners do 
their job right, the enemy must deal 
with uncertainty, and surprise can 
be achieved� This is not exactly new 
ground� Many students of history, as 
well as most current members of the 
national security enterprise, are aware, 
at least to some degree, of famous 
deception operations� These range from 
the Trojan horse of Odysseus to the 
deployment of the imaginary First U�S� 
Army Group to southeast England in 
the months before D-day 1944� Whaley 
reminds us that deception plans do not 
just appear; they are the brainchildren 
of talented individuals—the deception 
planners� Practise to Deceive neglects 
neither deception plans nor deception 
operations, but its primary intent is to 
shed light on those planners and how 
they think. As it turns out, that is a 
pretty tall order� In addition, Whaley 
tells readers they should walk away 
with an awareness of the threats that 
enemy deception efforts pose and how 
we can improve our own efforts�
Unfortunately, the book’s structure 
does not lead the reader to a 
rapid understanding of the mind of 
the deception planner� Indeed, most 
readers, particularly those unfamiliar 
with the subject, will be well served to 
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